• Figure 5: Estimate of
possible achievement
(sq m and cost s)
commercial and NGOs.
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1996
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1999
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1997

2002
1996

Organisation
Type
Commercial
Estimated as
NNGOs
Estimated as
NNGOs
Estimated as
Grand Total

Cost Per Sq m

Sq m Cleared

Total Cost

KM 3.6 or $ 1.8

20,971,472

KM 2.81 Or$ 1.40

2,414,930

KM 2.81 or $ 1.40

56,939,501

KM 75,497,299
($ 37,748,650)
KM 6,785,953
($ 3,392,977)
KM 160,000,000
($ 80,000,000)
KM 242,283,252
($ l2J,J .U,626)

80,325,903

2002

• Figure 6: Estimate of
possible achievement
commercial, NNGOs
and non-commercial.
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Cleared

Total Cost

KM 3.6or $ 1.8

20,971,472

KM 75,497,299
($ 37.748,650)

KM 2.81 Or$ 1.40

2,414,930

KM 6,785,953
($ 3,392,977)

KM 2.81 or $ 1.

14,944,750

KM 2.30or $1

10,224,808

KM2.10or$1

44,994,374

KM 160,000,000
($ 80,000.000)

93,550,334

KM 242,283,252
($ 121.141.626)

Grand Total

similar environmem, could potentially
have cleared 57 million more sq meters
for rhe same amount of money, as opposed
to the 11.4 million sq meters that was
achieved-an increase of 45.6 million sq
meters or 400 percent. The estimate of
possible achievement brings together a
combination of factors, and illustrates
that considerably more clearance could
have been achieved had more emphasis
been placed on the effective usc ofdonations.
It should also be emphasised that with
properly priorirised site selection the
possible increase could have been as high
as 25 percent more rhan indicated. In other
words, for a cost of KM 242 million, an
estimated output of 116.9 million sq
meters could have arguably been achieved.

Summary
The study attempted ro revi ew every aspecr of the demining process,
comparing organisation types and their
individua l and collective demining efforr.
It also reviewed a number of ocher aspects
that have an influence on effectiveness,
such as the need for a balanced response
to funding, the importance of timely
donations and the selection of the most
suitable ground conditions. In addition,
an example of the various time, effort,
method and costs illustrated the importance, not just of rime and site selection,

are "not interested" in their donati on
being utili sed more effective ly.
• In BiH, political, institutional and
personal views have had a negati ve
impact on the effective use of donations;
political and international objectives have
delayed the effective creation of a sustainable national capaci ty.
• Donors are supporting more
projects that have little or no effect on
improving productivity, cost effectiveness
or the removal of the cause.
• While annual output has remained
at around 6 to 6.7 million sg meters, the
number of tasks and mines destroyed has
gradually dec reased since 2000; yet,
technical survey and the increased n umber of deminers since 1999 should have
dramatically increased the sq meters
cleared and number of tasks completed.
The lack of a balanced, business-like
approach that addresses safety, quality,
productivity and effectiveness, at international, institutional and organisational
levels, as well as at the national mi ne
action programme level, is obvious. The
lack of char balanced approach, coupled
with the ineffective management of those
responsible for implementing donations
unnecessarily, prolongs the suffering of
affected populations. Yet, we still obtain
these donations "In the name of humanicy." If we are truly humanitarian we need
to focus more on removing the threat of
landmines as quickly and as safely as possible so that affected countries can begin
the long process of post-conflict recovery. •

bur also the selection of the most effective method. In order to work effectively
throughout the year, many decisions
about when, where and how to work need
to be made. Realistically, it will not
always be possible to achieve the ideal
effectiveness optimization. The study
proved char at presem, many of the critical elemems for achieving effectiveness
are not even considered. The facts are that:
• Many donations are not mad e
available in rime to achieve th e most
effective results.
• Sire selection, based on the best
conditions to achieve effective demining,
is rarely considered.
• Commerciai!NNGOs completed in order to 11iew the full study, check out
more sq meter!KM ($) rhan the non- www. eandii. com.
commercial with fewer personnel.
• Commercial and NNGOs have *Ail graphics courtesy ofthe author.
completed more tasks/KM ($) than the
non-commercial.
Contact Information
• Commercial and NNGOs have
destroyed more mines/KM ($) chan the Eddie Banks
non-commercial .
Project Direcror
• The average cost per sg meter un- E and I
dertaken by the non-commercial groups E-mail: banks@eandii.com
is at lease five rimes higher than the Websites: www.eandii.com
average cost per sq meter of the comwww.mkdcorp.com
mercial/NNGOs groups.
• The commerciai/NNGOs work
more hours per day and more days per
month than the non-commercial sector.
• Many donors stated that they
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From Kosovo to
Afghanistan, Cluster
Bombs Again
Cluster bombs have created problems in several countries, as they are one
of the many unexploded hazards often left behind after a conflict. This article
gives an overview of the threat and shows how the organization lntersos
has been working to help clear up the problem.

by Fernando Termentini,

/ntersos
Background
Cluster bomb units (CBUs) are
well known from the Gulf War to postDayton Bosnia, bur they were completely
forgotten by the Ottawa Treacy, which
didn't recognize them as APLs. In Kosovo
and in Afghanistan, they have proven to
be more dangerous chan APLs.
Cluster bombs are UXO char became
well known in Italy when some fishermen
found them in their nets in the Adriatic
Sea. Apart from the fishermen, whose
security was threatened, nobody at rhar
ri me spoke out in Italy about the fi.1ture
danger: hundreds of these UXO would
spread in Kosovo and Serbian territory,
killing and injuring people, mostly children.
In fact, CBUs don't have a self-deactivating
device that disables them if they do not
explode, so they remain as a long-lasting
danger for civilians, and they can explode
with a slight touch or upon removal.
Modern CBU models are BL-7 and
BL-755, made in the United Scares, and
M K-41, made in the United Kingdom.
T hey are the "elder sisters" of the weapons
used in Kuwait and of the KB-1 used by
Serbs and Muslim Bosnian people during
the Balkan Wars.
CBUs differ from APLs in their
appearance, the former being more
colourful and intriguing, so chat they
can trigger people's curiosity. An APL
is basically a defensive ordnance with a

local target, while a CBU is an offensive
ordnance with a wide-area target. CBUs
are real unexploded craps with much
more explosive capaci ty than APLs, as
an APL can kill at a range of 50 m, while
a CBU can be fatal at a range of 150m.
In fact, CBUs are dropped during
air raids in dispensers with a capacity
of more than 200 bombs each, landing
randomly on the ground. When they
do not explode, they hide in the grass
or under the ground, up to 50 em deep,
so char nobody can really cell where
they are. In principle, APLs should be
mapped, making their identification,
markina0 and clearance easier and allowing
civilians to avoid them. CBU impact
areas, instead, are very wide targets, difficult to identicy and map before systematic
surveys and clearance are carried out.
They can be identified scarring from
their drop point, if known, or by tracing
them on the ground in a sequence.

CBUs in Kosovo
CBU producers claim a dud rate
nor higher chan five percent, bur according
to our field experience, the actual
percentage is much more significant.
At the end of th e war, in fact, the
biggest and most urgent problem of
Kosovo was that of unexploded CBUs.
In rhe spri ng of 2000, CBUs were
spread everywhere on the ground,
hindering the economi c development
and agriculwral activities after the
winter of war.
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• The BL-97 (top and bottom)

In those days, we knew exactly where
90 percent of Kosovo's mines were,
because the Serbs handed over the maps
of registered mined areas to the international community. But we didn't know
with the same accuracy where CBUs had
been dropped. In fact, we had little news
on Universal Transverse Mercator (UTM)
coordinates of dropping points, which
made it virtually impossible to fix the
accual affected areas and quantifY rhe real
problem.
Immediately, the international
community launched an appeal to quickly

.
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and the professionalism of five major international non-governmental organizations (NGOs). These specialized in humanitarian clearance in general and, more
specifically, in the problem of CBUs.
Among these NGOs was the Inrersos
Mine Action Unit, a unique Italian NGO
that, besides a humanitarian relief project,
has conducted humanitarian mine and
UXO clearance as well as mine risk education projects since 1997.
International actors spent rwo years
clearing CBUs from Kosovo. Nowadays,
rhe final work is carried out by the Kosovo
Protection Civil Agency, with local experts trained at the beginning by rhe international technical expe rts of the
Imersos Mine Action Unit and other international NGOs.

CBUs in Other Countries
The threat of CBUs in the Balkans
is nor only a problem in Kosovo. In the
Republic of Serbia, for example, UXO
remain everywhere-even in public gardens-as the Imersos Mine Action Unit's
experts pointed our in June 2001 after
an accurate assessmem of the territory ro
define rhe magnitude of rhe problem.
In Afghanistan, we found a dud rare
as high as 50 percent in some case. Ir is
to be mentioned that, prior to the Coalition Forces Military Campaign, barrie
area clearance (BAC) operations in Afghanistan were mainly conducted by surface clearing. The widespread use of
CBUs during the air campaign and the

lethality of cluster submunitions have
forced the Mine Action Centre for Afghanistan (MACA) ro adopt stricter Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) similar to the ones adopted by the UN Mine
Acrion Centres in Kosovo and BosniaHerzegovina (BiH), where the depth of
clearance for CBUs is set at 500 mm.
Thus, it was necessary ro train BAC teams
on the use of the Schonsted metal detector, a new instrument specifically designed for detecting ferrous materials to
a depth of 500 mm. Intersos provided
approximately 60 Schonsted detectors ro
the Afghan NGO partner and trained
three BAC teams to use them properly
and efficiently.
The follow ing are two main examples of CBU data collected:
l. Kabul Province, Karoti Village:
363,500 sq m infested by mines (agricultural and grazing ground). Dispensers dropped: 4. Total cluster bombs
dropped (BL-97): 800. Wirh 80 percent
of rhe area cleared, we found 484
unexploded BL-97s (60 percent of the
rotal).
2. Kabul Province, Mosazajee Village: 248,000 sq m infested by mines
(agricultural and grazing grou nd). Dispensers dropped: 6. Total c l uster
bombs dropped (BL-97) : l ,200. With
90 percent of the area cleared, we
found 513 unexploded BL-97s (43
percent of rhe total).

CBUsandthe
International Community

reason, they were not restricted by the Ottawa Treaty. Cluster bombs, which continue robe used, pollute the environment
and are a serious threat for civilians. They
represent a real limitation ro rhe economic development of states and a serious economic burden for rhe international community.
In fact, a matter of primary importance is to conduct humanitarian clearance of these affected rerrirories, which
means areas need ro be 99.6 percent clear,
as international standards dictate. This
kind of percentage involves great costs
and long term funds from the international community, but gives back a lot in
terms of saving human lives.
Therefore, we believe that the international community should pay much
more attention ro every country affected
by CBUs, as a global and humanitarian
justice. And mostly, we believe that the
international community shou ld address
much more attention to the issue of possible funher use of CBUs in upcoming
conflicts, as in Iraq. •

*All graphics courtesy ofthe author.

Contact Information
Fernando Termentini
Imersos Mine Action Unit
E-mail: fernando.termentini@intersos.org
Websi te: www.inrersos.org
>vww.fernandotermentini.it

Overall, CBUs are not considered
similar in the effects to APLs. For this

The U.S. Humanitarian Mine
Action Program in Iraq
The United States government has developed a wide-ranging plan
to build an indigenous mine action capability within Iraq. The plan
will help rid Iraq of the threat of landmines and UXO so that the
country can focus on rebuilding it's society.

by t he United States
Humanitarian Mine Action
Program
Imagine growing up in a coLmtry where
you had to live with the sounds of gunfire
and the glow of missiles keeping you awake
at night. Imagine the overwhelming feeling
of joy when these terrors ended. Imagine
wanting to run freely among your friends,
but not being able to, because of the
dangerous objects that lay around your
neighborhood long after the war is over.
Iraq is such a country that now, more then
ever, needs an organized, well-developed
program to remove these threatening objects.
In order to help provide d1is humanitarian
assistance, the United States government has
developed a robust and wide-ranging
plan to build an indigenous mine action
capability within the country. The plan
will help rid Iraq of the threat of
landmines and UXO. With the help of
the United States, the United Nations and
other countries around the world, Iraq will
be able to foresee the end of it's landmine
problem and focus on rebuilding
it's society.

observe rs consider that landmines
present a clear risk in Iraq, but a more
significant threat is posed by UXO. T he
International Committee of the Red Cross
(ICRC) reported in 2001 that UXO
from previous conflicts have constituted
the major humanitarian threat for the
past several years in northern Iraq, along the
border with Iran, as well as a throughout
central and southern Iraq. The problem is
now exacerbated by the widespread
presence of abandoned munitions and
unexploded remnants from the most
recent conflict.
With the cessation of hostilities,
United States Cenrral Command

The LandminefUXO Problem

Village

Area Mined

Total number of

Percent of area

Number of

(in sq m)

CBUs dropped

cleared

unexploded CBUs

Karoti

363,500

800

80

484 (60 percent)

Mosazajee

248,200

1,200

90

513 (43 percent)

• F1gure 1. Examples of CBU data collected.
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Iraq has been the victim of violent
conflict throughout its hisrory, which, in
recent years, has left the land plagued with
landmines and UXO, disrupting the social,
economic and environmental development
of the country. Before Operation Iraqi
Freedom (OIF), an estimated 10-1 5
mi llion landmines we re deployed in
Iraq, dating from conflicts as far back
as World War II, with the majority of
the landmines laid during the Iran/Iraq
War from 1980 to 1988. International
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(USCENTCOM) set up procedures to
identifY minefield locations throughout
Iraq. Over 2,500 minefields, 2,200 UXO/
sub-munitions locations and thousands of
abandoned munitions sites have been
identified, and more are found on a daily
basis. USCENTCOM has also established
mechanisms to transfer information to
non-governmental organizations (NGOs)
about the minefield and U:X:O locations
as part of the effort to clear the land of
these silent threats.
Prior to OIF, the landmine/UXO
problem was we ll-documented in
nonhern Iraq only, thanks to a survey conducted by the United Nations. It was in
the north that the only substantial mine
action efforts took place, consisting of
landmine/UXO clearance and mine risk
education (MRE). The Iraqi government,
however, rook a dim view of mine action
in the north, attempting to bring such
practices to a halt. According to the

• EOO stockpi les.

